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1 Introduction
In this paper we examine the microdynamics of knowledge creation and trans-
fer by using a simple model. With a focus on the two person case, the basic
principles of this complex process can be uncovered. Although the two per-
son model admittedly has its limitations, particularly in the dynamic choice
of partners for knowledge creation and transfer, it has its advantages in ana-
lytical tractability because we can solve the equilibrium dynamics explicitly.
Elsewhere, in Berliant and Fujita (forthcoming), we provide extensions of the
model and results to the context of the general case of any number of potential
partners, but to maintain analytical tractability, we do not consider asymmet-
ric states or knowledge transfer. In contrast, the latter are the focus of this
paper.
Our major research questions are as follows. How do knowledge creation
and transfer occur? How do they perpetuate themselves? How do agents
change during this process? Are the equilibrium dynamics e¢ cient?
As people create and transfer knowledge, they change. Thus, the history
of meetings and their content is important. If two people meet for a long
time, then their base of knowledge in common increases, and their partnership
eventually becomes less productive. Similarly, if two persons have very di¤erent
knowledge bases, they have little common ground for communication, so their
partnership will not be very productive.
For these reasons, we attempt to model endogenous agent heterogeneity, or
horizontal agent di¤erentiation, to look at the permanent e¤ects of knowledge
creation and growth. Thus, we are examining how social capital is accumu-
lated at a micro level. Our model is analytically tractable, so we do not have
to resort to simulations; we nd each equilibrium path explicitly. The model is
also at an intermediate level of aggregation. That is, although it is at a more
micro level than large aggregate models such as those found in the endogenous
growth literature, we do not work out completely its microfoundations. That
is left to future research.
The analogy between partner dancing and working jointly to create and
exchange knowledge is useful, so we will use terms from these activities in-
terchangeably. Knowledge creation, exchange, and individual production all
occur simultaneously at each point in time. The dancers can work alone or
with their partner. They work together if and only if they both agree that
it is useful. Production always occurs at a rate proportional to the agents
current stock of knowledge, as does knowledge creation when an agent dances
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alone. The suitability of a partner dance depends on the stock of knowledge
the dancers have in common and their respective stocks of exclusive knowl-
edge. The fastest rate of knowledge creation occurs when these factors are in
balance.
Our results are summarized as follows. In a two person model where
myopic agents can decide whether or not to work with each other, there exist
many sink points in the interaction game, depending discontinuously on initial
heterogeneity. The most interesting of these features too much homogeneity
relative to the most productive state.
For simplicity, we employ a deterministic framework. It seems possible to
add stochastic elements to the model, but at the cost of complexity. It should
also be possible to employ the law of large numbers to a more basic stochastic
framework to obtain equivalent results.
Next we compare our work to the balance of the literature. Section 2 gives
the model and notation, Section 3 analyzes equilibrium in the case of two
participants or dancers, Section 4 examines welfare in the two person model,
whereas Section 5 provides our conclusions and suggestions for future dancing.
An appendix provides the proofs of key results.
The basic framework that employs knowledge creation as a black box
driving economic growth is usually called the endogenous growth model. Here
we make a modest attempt to open that black box. The literature using this
black box includes Shell (1966), Romer (1986, 1990), Lucas (1988), Jones and
Manuelli (1990), and many papers building on these contributions. There are
two key features of our model in relation to the endogenous growth literature.
First, our agents are heterogeneous, and that heterogeneity is endogenous to
the model. Second, the e¤ectiveness of the externality between agents working
together can change over time, and this change is endogenous.
Fujita and Weber (2003) consider a model where heterogeneity between
agents is exogenous and discrete. They examine the e¤ects of immigration
policy on the productivity and welfare of workers. They note that progress
in technology in a country where workers are highly trained is in small steps
involving intensive interactions between workers and a relatively homogeneous
work force, whereas countries that specialize in production of new knowledge
have a relatively heterogeneous work force. This motivates our examination of
how endogenous worker heterogeneity a¤ects industrial structure, the speed of
innovation, and the pattern of worker interaction.
Di¤erentiation of agents in terms of quality (or vertical characteristics) of
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knowledge is studied in Jovanovic and Rob (1989) in the context of a search
model. In contrast, our model examines (endogenous) horizontal heterogene-
ity of agents and its e¤ect on knowledge creation, knowledge transfer, and
consumption.
2 The Model - Ideas and Knowledge
In this section, we introduce the basic concepts of our model of ideas and
knowledge.
An idea is represented by a box. It has a label on it that everyone can
read (the label is common knowledge in the game we shall describe). This
label describes the contents. Each box contains an idea that is described by
its label. Learning the actual contents of the box, as opposed to its label,
takes time, so although anyone can read the label on the box, they cannot
understand its contents without investing time. This time is used to open the
box and to understand fully its contents. An example is a recipe for making
udon noodles as in Takamatsu. It is labelled as such, but would take time
to learn. Another example is reading a paper in a journal. Its label or title
can be understood quickly, but learning the contents of the paper requires an
investment of time. Production of a new paper, which is like opening a new
box, either jointly or individually, also takes time.
Suppose we have an innite number of boxes, each containing a di¤erent
piece of knowledge, which is what we call an idea. We put them in a row in
an arbitrary order.
There are 2 persons, i and j, in the economy. We assume that each person
has a replica of the innite row of boxes introduced above, and that each
copy of the row has the same order. Our model features continuous time.
Fix time t 2 R+ and consider person i. A box is indexed by k = 1; 2; :::
Take any box k. If person i knows the idea inside that box, we put a sticker
on it that says 1; otherwise, we put a sticker on it that says 0. That is,
let xki (t) 2 f0; 1g be the sticker on box k for person i at time t. The state
of knowledge, or just knowledge, of person i at time t is thus dened to be
Ki(t) = (x
1
i (t); x
2
i (t); :::) 2 f0; 1g1. The reason we use an innite vector of
possible ideas is that we are using an innite time horizon, and there are always
new ideas that might be discovered, even in the preparation of udon noodles.
Given Ki(t) with only nitely many non-zero components, there is an innite
number of ideas that could be created in the next step.
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In this paper, we will treat ideas symmetrically. Extensions to idea hier-
archies and knowledge structures will be discussed in the conclusions.
Given Ki(t) = (x1i (t); x
2
i (t); :::),
ni(t) =
1X
k=1
xki (t) (1)
represents the number of ideas known by person i at time t. Next, we will
dene the number of ideas that two persons, i and j, both know. Dene
Kj(t) = (x
1
j(t); x
2
j(t); :::) and
ncij(t) =
1X
k=1
xki (t)  xkj (t) (2)
So ncij(t) represents the number of ideas known by both persons i and j at
time t. Notice that i and j are symmetric in this denition, so ncij(t) = n
c
ji(t).
Dene
ndij(t) = ni(t)  ncij(t) (3)
to be the number of ideas known by person i but not known by person j at
time t.
Knowledge is a set of ideas that are possessed by a person at a particular
time. However, knowledge is not a static concept. New knowledge can be
produced either individually or jointly, and ideas can be shared with others.
But all of this activity takes time.
Next we describe the components of the rest of the model. At each time,
each of the two agents faces a decision about whether or not to meet with
the other. If both want to meet at a particular time, a meeting will occur. If
either does not want to meet, then they do not meet. If the agents do not meet
at a given time, then they produce separately and also create new knowledge
separately. If the two persons do decide to meet at a given time, then they
share older knowledge together and create new knowledge together.
So consider a given time t. In order to explain how knowledge creation,
knowledge exchange, and commodity production work, it is useful for intuition
(but not technically necessary) to view this time period of xed length as
consisting of subperiods of xed length. Each individual is endowed with a
xed amount of labor that is supplied inelastically during the period. In the
rst subperiod, individual production takes place. We shall assume constant
returns to scale in physical production, so it is not benecial for individuals
to collaborate in production. Each individual uses their labor during the rst
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subperiod to produce consumption good on their own, whether or not they are
meeting. We shall assume below that although there are no increasing returns
to scale in production, the productivity of a persons labor depends on their
stock of knowledge. Activity in the second subperiod depends on whether
or not there is a meeting. If there is no meeting, then each person spends
the second subperiod creating new knowledge on their own. Evidently, the
new knowledge created during this subperiod di¤ers between the two persons,
because they are not communicating. They open di¤erent boxes. Since there
is an innity of di¤erent boxes, the probability that the two agents will open
the same box (even at di¤erent points in time), either working by themselves
or in distinct meetings, is assumed to be zero. If there is a meeting, then
the second subperiod is divided into two parts. In the rst part, the two
persons who are meeting spend their time (and labor) sharing old knowledge,
boxes they have opened in previous time periods that the other person has
not opened. In the second part, they create new knowledge together, so they
open boxes together. We wish to emphasize that the division of a time period
into subperiods is purely an expositional device. Rigorously, whether or not
a meeting occurs determines how much attention is devoted to the various
activities at a given time.
What do the agents know when they face the decision about whether or not
to meet at time t? Each person knows both Ki(t) and Kj(t). In other words,
each person is aware of their own knowledge and is also aware of the others
knowledge. Thus, they also know ni(t), nj(t), ncij(t) = n
c
ji(t), n
d
ij(t), and n
d
ji(t)
when they decide whether or not to meet at time t. The notation for whether
or not a meeting actually occurs at time t is: ij(t)  ji(t) = 1 if a meeting
occurs and ij(t)  ji(t) = 0 if no meeting occurs at time t. Meetings only
occur if both persons agree that a meeting should take place.
Next, we must specify the dynamics of the knowledge system and the ob-
jectives of the people in the model in order to determine whether or not they
decide to meet at a particular time. In order to accomplish this, it is easi-
est to abstract away from the notation for specic boxes, Ki(t), and to focus
on the dynamics of the quantity statistics related to knowledge, ni(t), nj(t),
ncij(t) = n
c
ji(t), n
d
ij(t), and n
d
ji(t). Since we are treating ideas symmetrically, in
a sense these quantities are su¢ cient statistics for our analysis.
The simplest piece of the model to specify is what happens if there is no
meeting and the two people thus work in isolation. Let ai(t) be the rate of
creation of new ideas created by person i and let aj(t) be the rate of creation
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of new ideas created by j, both at time t. Let bij(t) and bji(t) be the rate of
transfer of ideas from i to j and from j to i, respectively, at time t.1 Then
we assume that the creation of new knowledge during isolation (ij(t) = 0) is
governed by the following equations:
ai(t) =   ni(t) and aj(t) =   nj(t) when ij(t) = 0. (4)
bij(t) = 0 and bji(t) = 0 when ij(t) = 0.
So we assume that if there is no meeting at time t, individual knowledge grows
at a rate proportional to the knowledge already acquired by an individual.
Meanwhile, knowledge held commonly by the two persons does not grow. In
particular, ideas are not shared.
If a meeting does occur at time t (ij(t) = 1), then both knowledge exchange
between the two persons and joint knowledge creation occur. When a meeting
takes place, joint knowledge creation is governed by the following dynamics:2
aij(t) =   [ncij(t)  ndij(t)  ndji(t)]
1
3 (5)
So when the two people meet, joint knowledge creation occurs at a rate propor-
tional to the normalized product of their knowledge in common, the exclusive
knowledge of i, and the exclusive knowledge of j. The rate of creation of new
knowledge is highest when the proportions of ideas in common, ideas exclusive
to person i, and ideas exclusive to person j are split evenly. Ideas in common
are necessary for communication, whereas ideas exclusive to one person or the
other imply more heterogeneity or originality in the collaboration. If one per-
son in the collaboration does not have exclusive ideas, there is no reason for
the other person to meet and collaborate. The multiplicative nature of the
function in equation (5) drives the relationship between knowledge creation
and the relative proportions of ideas in common and ideas exclusive to one or
the other agent.
1In principle, all of these time-dependent quantities are positive integers. However, for
simplicity we take them to be continuous (in R+) throughout the paper. One interpretation
is that the creation or sharing of an idea occurs at a stochastic time, and the real numbers
are taken to be the probability of a jump in a Poisson process. The use of an integer instead
of a real number seems to add little but complication to the analysis.
2We may generalize equation (5) as follows:
aij(t) = max
n
(  ")ni(t); (  ")nj(t); 

ncij(t)  ndij(t)  ndji(t)
 1
3
o
where " > 0 represents the costs from the lack of concentration. This generalization, however,
does not change the results presented in this paper in any essential way.
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Under these circumstances, no knowledge creation in isolation occurs. Dur-
ing meetings at time t, knowledge transfer occurs in addition to the creation
of new knowledge. Knowledge transfer is governed by the following dynamics:
bij(t) =   [ndij(t)  ncij(t)]
1
2 (6)
bji(t) =   [ndji(t)  ncij(t)]
1
2
So when a meeting occurs, knowledge transfer from i to j happens at a rate
proportional to the normalized product of the number of ideas that person i
has but that person j does not have, and the ideas common to both persons.
The explanation is that communication is necessary for knowledge transfer, so
the two persons must have some ideas in common (ncij(t)). But in addition,
person i must have some ideas that are not already possessed by person j
(ndij(t)). The same intuition applies to knowledge transfer in the opposite
direction from j to i, represented by the second equation in (6). The change
in the number of ideas that both persons have in common ( _ncij(t)) is the sum
of knowledge transfers in both directions and the new ideas jointly created.
From person is perspective, the number of ideas that i has but j doesnt have
(ndij(t)) decreases with knowledge transfers from i to j. Finally, the change
in the number of ideas possessed by person i is the sum of the ideas that are
jointly created and the number of ideas transferred from j to i. The analogous
statements hold for the variables associated with j.
Let us focus on agent i (the equations for agent j are analogous). With
a meeting, we have the following dynamics incorporating both knowledge cre-
ation and transfer:
_ni(t) = aij(t) + bji(t)
_ncij(t) = aij(t) + bij(t) + bji(t)
_ndij(t) =  bij(t)
Given this structure, we can dene the rates of idea innovation and knowl-
edge transfer at time t, depending on whether or not a meeting occurs.
_ni(t) = [1  ij(t)]    ni(t) +
ij(t)  (  [ncij(t)  ndij(t)  ndji(t)]
1
3 +   [ndji(t)  ncij(t)]
1
2 )
_ncij(t) = ij(t)  (  [ncij(t)  ndij(t)  ndji(t)]
1
3 +   [ndji(t)  ncij(t)]
1
2
+  [ndij(t)  ncji(t)]
1
2 )
_ndij(t) = [1  ij(t)]    ni(t)  ij(t)    [ndij(t)  ncji(t)]
1
2
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Whether a meeting occurs or not, there is production in each period for
both persons. Felicity or instantaneous utility in that time period is dened to
be the quantity of output.3 Dene yi(t) to be production output (or felicity)
for person i at time t, and dene yj(t) to be production output (or felicity) of
person j at time t. Normalizing the coe¢ cient of production to be 1, we take
yi(t) = ni(t) (7)
so
_yi(t) = _ni(t)
By denition,
_yi(t)
yi(t)
=
_ni(t)
ni(t)
(8)
which represents the rate of growth of income.
Finally, we must dene the rule used by each person to decide whether they
want a meeting at time t or not. Formally,
ij(t) = 1 () (9)
  [ncij(t)  ndij(t)  ndji(t)]
1
3 +   [ndji(t)  ncij(t)]
1
2 >   ni(t) and
  [ncji(t)  ndji(t)  ndij(t)]
1
3 +   [ndij(t)  ncji(t)]
1
2 >   nj(t)
To keep the model tractable in this rst analysis, we assume a myopic rule. So
a person would like a meeting if and only if the increase in their rate of output
with a meeting is higher than the increase in their rate of output without a
meeting.4 Note that we use the increase in the rate of output rather than the
rate of output since in a continuous time model, the rate of output at time t
is una¤ected by the decision about whether to meet made at time t.
This completes the statement of the model. Dropping the time dependence
of variables to analyze dynamics, we obtain the following equations of motion.
_yi = _ni = [1  ij]    ni + (10)
ij  (  [ncij  ndij  ndji]
1
3 +   [ndji  ncij]
1
2 )
_ncij = ij  (  [ncij  ndij  ndji]
1
3 +   [ndji  ncij]
1
2 +   [ndij  ncji]
1
2 )
_ndij = [1  ij]    ni   ij    [ndij  ncji]
1
2
This system, with analogous equations for agent j, represents a partner dance.
3Given that the focus of this paper is on knowledge creation and transfer rather than
production, we use the simplest possible form for the production function.
4We will see that the rule used in the case of ties is not important.
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3 Equilibrium Dynamics
In order to analyze our system, we rst divide all of our equations by the total
number of ideas possessed by i and j:
nij = ndij + n
d
ji + n
c
ij (11)
and dene new variables
mcij  mcji =
ncij
nij
=
ncji
nij
mdij =
ndij
nij
, mdji =
ndji
nij
From (11), we obtain
1 = mdij +m
d
ji +m
c
ij (12)
After some detailed calculations (see Appendix a for all of the steps), we
obtain _mdij and _m
d
ji as functions of m
d
ij and m
d
ji only, as follows.
_mdij = [1  ij]    f(1 mdij)(1 mdij  mdji)g (13)
 ij  f  [mdij  (1 mdij  mdji)]
1
2 +mdij    [(1 mdij  mdji) mdij mdji]
1
3g
_mdji = [1  ij]    f(1 mdji)(1 mdij  mdji)g
 ij  f  [mdji  (1 mdij  mdji)]
1
2 +mdji    [(1 mdij  mdji) mdji mdij]
1
3g
To study this more, we must study (9) further. Deleting time indices and
dividing by nij,
ij = 1 ()
  [mcij mdij mdji]
1
3 +   [mdji mcij]
1
2 >   (1 mdji)
and   [mcij mdji mdij]
1
3 +   [mdij mcij]
1
2 >   (1 mdij)
Substituting further,
ij = 1 ()
  [(1 mdji  mdij) mdij mdji]
1
3 +   [mdji  (1 mdji  mdij)]
1
2 >   (1 mdji)
and   [(1 mdji mdij) mdji mdij]
1
3 +  [mdij  (1 mdji mdij)]
1
2 >   (1 mdij)
In other words, meetings occur when the rate of growth of income or utility of
each person is higher with a meeting than without a meeting.
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Dene
Fi(m
d
ij;m
d
ji) =   [(1 mdji  mdij) mdij mdji]
1
3 + (14)
  [mdji  (1 mdji  mdij)]
1
2     (1 mdji)
Fj(m
d
ij;m
d
ji) =   [(1 mdji  mdij) mdji mdij]
1
3 +
  [mdij  (1 mdji  mdij)]
1
2     (1 mdij)
and
Mi = f(mdij;mdji) 2 R2+ j mdij +mdji  1, Fi(mdij;mdji) > 0g (15)
Mj = f(mdij;mdji) 2 R2+ j mdij +mdji  1, Fj(mdij;mdji) > 0g (16)
whereas
M =Mi \Mj
The function Fi(mdij;m
d
ji) represents the net benet for i of meeting instead
of isolation. Likewise for Fj(mdij;m
d
ji). The set Mi represents those pairs
(mdij;m
d
ji) such that i wants to meet with j, since for these pairs, the rate of
growth of is utility or income with a meeting is higher than the rate of growth
of is utility or income without a meeting. The set Mj represents those pairs
(mdij;m
d
ji) such that j wants to meet with i. Of course, the set M represents
those pairs (mdij;m
d
ji) such that both persons want to meet with each other.
Thus, meetings will occur at time t for pairs in M .
We represent our model in our Figures as a function of mdij and m
d
ji; since
mdij + m
d
ji + m
c
ij = 1, we know that 1   mcij = mdij +mdji  1, where this
inequality is represented by half of the unit square (a triangle) in R2. We put
mdij on the horizontal axis and m
d
ji on the vertical axis, omitting m
c.
Figure 1, panels (a) and (b) illustrate the sets Mi and Mj, respectively,
for  =  = 1 and for various values of . Of course, panels (a) and (b) are
mirror images of each other across the 45 line. Figure 2 illustrates M , the
set of pairs where both persons want to meet, and its complement, where no
meetings occur, for the same parameter values. When (mdij;m
d
ji) is close to the
boundary of the triangle, meetings do not occur. The reason is that the two
persons have too little in common to interact e¤ectively (near the downward
sloping diagonal) or someone has too little exclusive knowledge (near the axes)
to interact e¤ectively. Meetings only take place in the interior where the three
components of knowledge are relatively balanced.
FIGURES 1 AND 2 GO HERE
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In fact we can describe the properties of the set M in general. The set M
has the shape depicted in Figure 2; see Appendix b for proof. In particular,M
is roughly the shape of an apple core aligned on the 45 line. As  increases,
the productivity of creating ideas alone increases, so people are less likely to
want to meet to create, implying that each Mi and Mj shrinks as  increases,
as doesM . If  is a little more than 1, M disappears. To be precise, letM()
be the set M under the parameter value . Then, whenever 1 < 2, the set
M(2) is entirely contained in M(1). Thus, as shown in Figure 2, there is
a unique point B contained in every M(), provided M() is nonempty. We
call B the bliss point, for the point B in Figure 2 is the point where the rate of
increase in income or utility is maximized for each person, as we will explain
in the next section (see also Lemma A6 in Appendix c).
Next we discuss the dynamics of the system. Consider rst the case where
there is no meeting, so ij = 0 is xed exogenously. Then from equations (13),
the dynamics are given by the following equations:
_mdij =   (1 mdij)(1 mdij  mdji)
_mdji =   (1 mdji)(1 mdij  mdji)
FIGURE 3 GOES HERE
Figure 3, panel (a) illustrates the gradient eld assuming that ij = 0.
Several facts follow quickly from these derivations. First, if there is no meeting
(ij = 0), then both _mdij and _m
d
ji are non-negative, and positive on the interior
of the triangle. So if there is no meeting, the vector eld points to the northeast.
Furthermore, in the lower half of the triangle where mdij  mdji (the other part
is symmetric), we have
_mdji
_mdij
=
1 mdji
1 mdij
 1
where the inequality is strict o¤ of the diagonal. Thus, when ij = 0, the
vector eld points northeast but toward the diagonal. Under the assumption
of no meeting, the system tends to sink points along the diagonal line where
mdij +m
d
ji = 1, illustrated in Figure 3, panel (a) by a line between (0; 1) and
(1; 0).
Figure 3, panel (b) illustrates the gradient eld assuming that ij = 1.
Then (13) implies:
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_mdij =    [mdij  (1 mdij  mdji)]
1
2  mdij    [(1 mdij  mdji) mdij mdji]
1
3
_mdji =    [mdji  (1 mdij  mdji)]
1
2  mdji    [(1 mdij  mdji) mdji mdij]
1
3
(17)
Both of these expressions are negative on the interior of the triangle and the
vector eld points southwest. Consider, for convenience, the lower half of the
triangle where mdij  mdji; the other part is symmetric. Then
_mdji
_mdij
=
  [mdji  (1 mdij  mdji)]
1
2 +mdji    [(1 mdij  mdji) mdji mdij]
1
3
  [mdij  (1 mdij  mdji)]
1
2 +mdij    [(1 mdij  mdji) mdij mdji]
1
3
 1
where the inequality is strict o¤ of the diagonal. Thus, the vector eld points
southwest but toward the diagonal, as illustrated in Figure 3, panel (b). The
only sink is at (0; 0), so the system eventually moves there under the assump-
tion of a meeting.
Next, we combine the case where there is no meeting (ij = 0) with the
case where there is a meeting (ij = 1), and let the agents choose whether or
not to meet. This is illustrated in Figure 4.
FIGURE 4 GOES HERE
The model follows the dynamics for meetings (ij = 1) on M and the
dynamics for no meetings (ij = 0) on the complement of M .
In general, there is a continuum of stable points of the system, correspond-
ing to the points where mdij +m
d
ji = 1. For these points, eventually the myopic
return to no meeting dominates the returns to meetings, since eventually the
two persons have almost nothing in common. These stable points, however,
are not very interesting.
We have not completely specied the dynamics. This is especially impor-
tant on the boundary of M , where at least one person is indi¤erent between
meeting and not meeting. We take an arbitrarily small unit of time, t, and
assume that if at least one person becomes indi¤erent between meeting and
not meeting, but the two persons are currently meeting, then the meeting must
continue for at least t units of time. Similarly, if the two persons are not
meeting when one person becomes indi¤erent between meeting and not meet-
ing while the other wants to meet or is indi¤erent, then they cannot meet for
at least t units of time. So if a person becomes indi¤erent between meeting
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or not meeting at time t, the function ij(t) cannot change its value until time
t+t. Finally, when at least one person initially happens to be on the bound-
ary of M (that is, at least one person is indi¤erent between meeting and not
meeting), then they cannot meet for at least t units of time. Under this set
of rules, we can be more specic about the dynamic process near the boundary
of M .
In terms of dynamics, if the system does not evolve toward the uninteresting
stable points where there are no meetings (and the two people have nothing in
common), eventually the system reaches the southwest boundary of the setM .
From there, the assumption that ij is constant over time intervals of at least
lengtht at the boundary ofM will drive the system in a zigzag process toward
the place furthest to the southwest and on the diagonal that is a member of
M . In other words, this is the point J = (mJ ;mJ) 2 M with lowest norm. It
is the remaining stable point of our model. Small movements around J will
continue due to our assumption about the dynamics at the boundary of M ,
namely that meetings or isolation are sticky. As t! 0, the process converges
to the point J . The point J features symmetry between the two agents with a
large degree of homogeneity relative to the remainder of the points in M and
the other points in the triangle generally.
So given various initial compositions of knowledge (mdij;m
d
ji), where will the
system end up? If the initial composition of knowledge is relatively unbalanced,
in other words near the boundary of the triangle, the sink will be a point on
the diagonal where mdij +m
d
ji = 1. If the initial composition of knowledge is
relatively balanced, then the sink will be the point J .
Using the facts about the shape of M , the point J exists and is unique as
long as M 6= ;.
At the point J = (mJ ;mJ), mJ  2
5
, for reasons explained in the next
section.
Without loss of generality, we can allow ij to take values in [0; 1] rather
than f0; 1g. The interpretation of a fractional ij is that at each instant of
time, a person divides their time between a meeting ij proportion of that
instant and isolation (1   ij) proportion of that instant. All of our results
concerning the model when ij is restricted to f0; 1g carry over to the case
where ij 2 [0; 1]. The reason is that except on the boundary of M , persons
strictly prefer ij 2 f0; 1g to fractional values of ij, as each persons objective
function is linear in ij. On the boundary of M , our rule concerning dynamics
prevents ij from taking on fractional values, as it must retain its value from
14
the previous iteration of the process for at least time t > 0. So if the process
pierces the boundary from inside M , it must retain ij = 1 for an additional
time of at least t. If it pierces the boundary from outside M , it must retain
ij = 0 for an additional time of at least t. It may seem trivial to allow
fractional ij when discussing equilibrium behavior, but allowing fractional ij
is crucial to the next section, where we consider e¢ ciency.
4 E¢ ciency
To construct an analog of Pareto e¢ ciency in this model, we use a social
planner who can choose whether or not people should meet in each time period.
As noted above, we shall allow the social planner to choose values of ij in [0; 1],
so that persons can be required to meet for a percentage of the total time in a
period, and not meet for the remainder of the period. To avoid dependence of
our notion of e¢ ciency on a discount rate, we employ the following alternative
concepts. The rst is stronger than the second. A path of ij is a piecewise
continuous function of time (on [0;1)) taking values in [0; 1]. For each path
of ij, there corresponds a unique time path of mdij determined by equation
(13), respecting the initial condition, and thus a unique time path of income
yi(t; ij). We say that a path 
0
ij (strictly) dominates a path ij if
yi(t; 
0
ij)  yi(t; ij) and yj(t; 0ij)  yj(t; ij) for all t  0
with strict inequality for at least one over a positive interval of time. As this
concept is quite strong, and thus di¢ cult to use as an e¢ ciency criterion, it
will sometimes be necessary to employ a weaker concept, which we discuss
next. We say that a path ij is overtaken by a path 
0
ij if there exists a t
0 such
that
yi(t; 
0
ij)  yi(t; ij) and yj(t; 0ij)  yj(t; ij) for all t > t0
with strict inequality for at least one over a positive interval of time.
Two types of sink points were analyzed in the last section. First consider
equilibrium paths that have mJ as the sink point; they reach mJ in nite time
and stay there. Using Figure 5, we will construct an alternative path 0ij that
dominates the equilibrium path ij.
FIGURE 5 GOES HERE
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In constructing this path, we will make use of income changes along the
upward sloping diagonal in Figure 4. Setting
mdij = m
d
ji = m (18)
yi = yj = y
we use (10) and (11) to obtain
_y(t)
y(t)
=
_y(t)
ni(t)
=
_y(t)
n(t)[1 m(t)] (19)
= [1  ij(t)]  + ij(t)  f  [(1  m(t)
1 m(t))  (
m(t)
1 m(t))
2]
1
3
+  [(1  m(t)
1 m(t))  (
m(t)
1 m(t))]
1
2 )g
To simplify notation, we dene the growth rate when the two persons meet,
ij = 1, as
g(m) =   [(1  m
1 m)  (
m
1 m)
2]
1
3 (20)
+  [(1  m
1 m)  (
m
1 m)]
1
2 )
Thus
_y(t)
y(t)
= [1  ij]  + ij  g(m) (21)
Figure 5 illustrates the graph of the function g(m) as a bold line for  =
 = 1. We can show5 that g(m) is strictly quasi-concave on [0; 1
2
], achieving
its maximal value at mB 2 [1
3
; 2
5
]. We can also show (see Lemma A6 of the
appendix) that m = mB corresponds to the bliss point B in Figure 2. In other
words, whenever M 6= ;, B = (mB;mB) 2 M , so the point J = (mJ ;mJ)
dened in Figure 4 and in the previous section has the property thatmJ  2=5,
as it is dened to be the point in M on the diagonal and closest to the origin.
We dene the point I = (mI ;mI) in Figure 4 to be the point in M on the
diagonal and farthest from the origin.
Let t0 be the time at which the equilibrium path reaches (mJ ;mJ). Let the
planner set 0ij(t) = ij(t) for t  t0, taking the same path as the equilibrium
path until t0. From this time on, the planner uses only symmetric points,
namely those on the upward sloping diagonal in Figure 4; these points comprise
the horizontal axis in Figure 5. At time t0, the planner takes 0ij(t) = 0 until
5See Lemma A6 of the appendix.
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(mI ;mI) is attained, prohibiting meetings so that the dancers can prot from
ideas created in isolation. Then the planner sets 0ij(t) = 1 until (m
J ;mJ)
is attained, requiring meetings and the development of more knowledge in
common. The last two phases are repeated as necessary.
From Figure 5, the income paths yi(t; 
0
ij) and yj(t; 
0
ij) generated by the
path 0ij clearly dominate the income paths yi(t; ij) and yj(t; ij)generated by
the equilibrium path ij. Thus, the equilibrium path is far from the most
productive path.
Next consider equilibrium paths ij(t) that end in sink points on the down-
ward sloping diagonal in Figure 4. Our dominance criterion cannot be used in
this situation, since for potentially dominating plans, the planner will need to
force the couple to meet outside of regionM in Figure 4 in early time periods.
During this time interval, the dancers could do better by not meeting, and thus
a comparison of the income derived from the paths would rely on the discount
rate, something we are trying to avoid. So we will use our weaker criterion
here, that of overtaking.
Given an equilibrium path ij(t) with sink point on the diagonal, the plan-
ner can construct an overtaking path 0ij(t) as follows. The rst phase is to
construct a path 0ij(t) that reaches a point in region M in nite time. Such a
path can readily be constructed using Figures 3 and 4.6 After reaching region
M , the second and third phases are the same as described above for the con-
struction of a path that dominates one ending with mJ . Since the paths with
sinks on the downward sloping diagonal have income growth  at every time,
whereas the new path 0ij(t) features income growth that exceeds  whenever
the couple is meeting, 0ij(t) overtakes ij(t).
The most productive state mB is characterized by less homogeneity than
the stable point mJ . Of course, attaining mB requires the social planner to
force the two persons not to meet some of the time. Otherwise, the system
evolves toward more homogeneity.
6Such a path can be constructed as follows. In Figure 2 or Figure 4, take the union of
all closed, one dimensional intervals parallel to the 45 line with one endpoint on an axis
and the other endpoint a member of M . Call this set M 0. From time 0, take  = 1. Using
Figure 3(b), the path hits M 0 in nite time. From this time on, take  = 0. Using Figure
3(a), the path hits M in nite time.
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5 Conjectures and Conclusions
We have considered a model of knowledge creation and exchange that is based
on individual behavior, allowing myopic agents to decide whether joint or
individual production is best for them at any given time. This is a pure
externality model of knowledge creation, with no markets.
In the present context of two people, there are a continuum of sink points
(equilibria) for the knowledge accumulation process. Every state where the
two agents have a negligible proportion of ideas in common is attainable as
an equilibrium for some initial condition. There is one additional and more
interesting sink, involving a large degree of homogeneity as well as symmetry
of the two agents, and this is attainable from a non-negligible set of initial
conditions. Relative to the e¢ cient state, the rst set of sink points has
agents that are too heterogeneous, while the second sink point has agents that
are too homogeneous.7
Of course, the major limitation of this work is the use of only two people.
In other work, we employ more agents, but at a cost, namely the absence of
knowledge transfer while limiting ourselves to symmetric states.
Here we discuss the many alternate directions for future work and exten-
sions of the framework. Chief among these are the introduction of foresight on
the part of agents, the introduction of stochastic elements into the model, and
the introduction of side payments. Though the two person model is limited,
extensions of this basic framework are much easier than when there are more
persons. It is apparent from the analysis in section 3 that limited foresight,
in the form of short sightedness instead of perfect myopia, will not be enough
to overturn our results. In order to completely overturn the results of section
2, the agents must have long range foresight. In this case, they can construct
more e¢ cient paths as in section 3. Moreover, long range foresight in com-
bination with side payments could produce tutelage when the initial state is
asymmetric. When the person with more knowledge is willing to accept pay-
ment for teaching, the equilibrium paths can look very di¤erent from what we
have proposed.
In the international context, where each country is often represented by one
agent, our model might be applicable. Two countries or two regions would
be assigned representative agents. In that context, knowledge creation and
transfer, especially as related to developed and developing countries, would be
7The proximate cause is agent myopia.
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of interest. Analogs of the transfer paradox would be quite fascinating.8
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6 Appendix
6.1 Appendix a
Theorem A1: Knowledge dynamics evolve according to the system:
_mdij = [1  ij]    f(1 mdij)(1 mdij  mdji)g
 ij  f  [mdij  (1 mdij  mdji)]
1
2 +mdij    [(1 mdij  mdji) mdij mdji]
1
3g
_mdji = [1  ji]    f(1 mdji)(1 mdij  mdji)g
 ji  f  [mdji  (1 mdij  mdji)]
1
2 +mdji    [(1 mdij  mdji) mdji mdij]
1
3g
Proof of Theorem A1: Recalling (3),
mdij +m
c = 1 mdji
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and dividing by nij yields
_yi
nij
=
_ni
nij
= [1  ij]    (1 mdji) +
ij  (  [mc mdij mdji]
1
3 +   [mdji mc]
1
2 )
_ncij
nij
= ij  (  [mc mdij mdji]
1
3 +   [mdji mc]
1
2
+  [mdij mc]
1
2 )
_ndij
nij
= [1  ij]    (1 mdji)  ij    [mdij mc]
1
2
Substituting (12) for mc,
_yi
nij
=
_ni
nij
= [1  ij]    (1 mdji) +
ij  (  [(1 mdij  mdji) mdij mdji]
1
3 +   [mdji  (1 mdij  mdji)]
1
2 )
_ncij
nij
= ij  (  [(1 mdij  mdji) mdij mdji]
1
3 +   [mdji  (1 mdij  mdji)]
1
2
+  [mdij  (1 mdij  mdji)]
1
2 )
_ndij
nij
= [1  ij]    (1 mdji)  ij    [mdij  (1 mdij  mdji)]
1
2
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Now
_mdij =
d(ndij=n
ij)
dt
=
_ndij
nij
  n
d
ij  _nij
(nij)2
=
_ndij
nij
  n
d
ij
nij
 _n
ij
nij
= [1  ij]    (1 mdji)  ij    [mdij  (1 mdij  mdji)]
1
2  mdij  (
_ndij
n
+
_ndji
n
+
_ncij
n
)
= [1  ij]    (1 mdji)  ij    [mdij  (1 mdij  mdji)]
1
2
 mdij  f[1  ij]    (1 mdji)  ij    [mdij  (1 mdij  mdji)]
1
2 + [1  ij]    (1 mdij)
 ij    [mdji  (1 mdij  mdji)]
1
2 + ij  (  [(1 mdij  mdji) mdij mdji]
1
3
+  [mdji  (1 mdij  mdji)]
1
2 +   [mdij  (1 mdij  mdji)]
1
2 )g
= [1  ij]    (1 mdji)  ij    [mdij  (1 mdij  mdji)]
1
2
 mdij  f[1  ij]    (1 mdji) + [1  ij]    (1 mdij)
+ij    [(1 mdij  mdji) mdij mdji]
1
3g
= [1  ij]    f1 mdji   2mdij + (mdij)2 +mdij mdjig
 ij  f  [mdij  (1 mdij  mdji)]
1
2 +mdij    [(1 mdij  mdji) mdij mdji]
1
3g
= [1  ij]    f(1 mdij)(1 mdji) mdij + (mdij)2g
 ij  f  [mdij  (1 mdij  mdji)]
1
2 +mdij    [(1 mdij  mdji) mdij mdji]
1
3g
= [1  ij]    f(1 mdij)(1 mdji) mdij(1 mdij)g
 ij  f  [mdij  (1 mdij  mdji)]
1
2 +mdij    [(1 mdij  mdji) mdij mdji]
1
3g
= [1  ij]    f(1 mdij)(1 mdji  mdij)g
 ij  f  [mdij  (1 mdij  mdji)]
1
2 +mdij    [(1 mdij  mdji) mdij mdji]
1
3g
The fourth line follows from (11), that implies
_nij
nij
=
_ndij
nij
+
_ndji
nij
+
_ncij
nij
(22)
Symmetric calculations hold for _mdji. 
6.2 Appendix b
Theorem A2: Suppose that (mdij;m
d
ji) 2 M . Then (mdji;mdij) 2 M and
the line segment [(mdij;m
d
ji); (m
d
ji;m
d
ij)] M . In particular, if M 6= ;, then it
contains a point on the diagonal segment [(0; 0); (1; 1)]. Moreover, the diagonal
intersected with M is a convex set. In fact, every line parallel to the diagonal
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intersected with M is a convex set. Finally, every point in M \ ((0; 0); (1; 1))
has a neighborhood contained in M .
To prove Theorem A2, we proceed with a nite sequence of lemmata. First
we need some denitions to make notation easier.
Denitions:
f(m;m0) =   [(1 m m0) m m0] 13
h(m;m0) =   [(1 m m0) m0] 12
With these denitions, the equations deningMi (15) andMj (16) become:
f(mdij;m
d
ji) + h(m
d
ij;m
d
ji)    (1 mdji) > 0 (23)
f(mdji;m
d
ij) + h(m
d
ji;m
d
ij)    (1 mdij) > 0 (24)
Lemma A1: (mdij;m
d
ji) 2 Mi and mdij  mdji imply (mdji;mdij) 2 Mi.
(mdij;m
d
ji) 2Mj and mdij  mdji imply (mdji;mdij) 2Mj.
Proof of Lemma A1: f(mdij;m
d
ji) = f(m
d
ji;m
d
ij).
h(mdji;m
d
ij)
h(mdij ;m
d
ji)
= [
mdij
mdji
]
1
2  1,
since mdij  mdji. (mdij;mdji) 2 Mi implies f(mdij;mdji) + h(mdij;mdji)   (1  
mdji) > 0. Since h(m
d
ji;m
d
ij)  h(mdij;mdji) and mdij  mdji, f(mdji;mdij) +
h(mdji;m
d
ij)  (1 mdij) > 0. Hence, (mdji;mdij) 2Mi. A symmetric argument
works for the second part of the lemma. 
Lemma A2: Suppose that mdij  mdji. Then (mdij;mdji) 2M if and only if
(mdij;m
d
ji) 2Mi.
Proof of Lemma A2: It is obvious that (mdij;m
d
ji) 2M implies (mdij;mdji) 2
Mi. So suppose that (mdij;m
d
ji) 2 Mi. Then by symmetry of the deni-
tions of Mi and Mj, (mdji;m
d
ij) 2 Mj. By Lemma A1, (mdji;mdij) 2 Mi.
Applying symmetry of the denitions again yields (mdij;m
d
ji) 2 Mj. Hence
(mdij;m
d
ji) 2Mj \Mi =M . 
Lemma A3: Suppose that (mdij;m
d
ji) 2 M . Then (mdji;mdij) 2 M and
the line segment [(mdij;m
d
ji); (m
d
ji;m
d
ij)] M . In particular, if M 6= ;, then it
contains a point on the diagonal segment [(0; 0); (1; 1)].
Proof of Lemma A3: First, if (mdij;m
d
ji) 2 M , then (mdji;mdij) 2 M
by symmetry of the denitions of Mi and Mj. Now consider the line seg-
ment [(mdij;m
d
ji); (m
d
ji;m
d
ij)]. In particular, consider the case m
d
ij  mdji and
the line segment between (mdij;m
d
ji) and the point (m;m) on the diagonal,
[(mdij;m
d
ji); (m;m)]  [(mdij;mdji); (mdji;mdij)] (the line segment [(m;m); (mdji;mdij)]
can be covered with a symmetric argument). Since for all (bmdij; bmdji) 2 [(mdij;mdji); (m;m)],
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bmdij  bmdji, by Lemma A2 it su¢ ces to show that (bmdij; bmdji) 2 Mi. We must
verify the equation stating that (bmdij; bmdji) 2Mi, namely
f(bmdij; bmdji) + h(bmdij; bmdji)    (1  bmdji) > 0 (25)
Now for all (bmdij; bmdji) 2 [(mdij;mdji); (m;m)], there exists an x  0 with bmdij =
mdij   x  mdji + x = bmdji, since the line segment lies below the diagonal. Now
f(mdij   x;mdji + x)  f(mdij;mdji)
=   [(1 mdji  mdij)  (mdij   x)  (mdji + x)]
1
3     [(1 mdji  mdij)  (mdij)  (mdji)]
1
3
=   [(1 mdji  mdij)  (mdij)  (mdji) + (1 mdji  mdij)  x  (mdij  mdji   x)]
1
3
   [(1 mdji  mdij)  (mdij)  (mdji)]
1
3
   [(1 mdji  mdij)  (mdij)  (mdji) + (1 mdji  mdij)  x2]
1
3
   [(1 mdji  mdij)  (mdij)  (mdji)]
1
3
 0
h(mdij   x;mdji + x)  h(mdij;mdji)
=   [(mdji + x)  (1 mdji  mdij)]
1
2     [mdji  (1 mdji  mdij)]
1
2  0
Finally,
  (1 mdji   x)    (1 mdji)
Hence,
f(bmdij; bmdji) + h(bmdij; bmdji)    (1  bmdji)
= f(mdij   x;mdji + x) + h(mdij   x;mdji + x)    (1 mdji   x)
 f(mdij;mdji) + h(mdij;mdji)    (1 mdji) > 0
The last line follows because (mdij;m
d
ji) 2M . 
Lemma A4: For any constant a 2 ( 1; 1) the intersection of the set M
and the line f(mdij;mdji) 2 R2+ j mdij +mdji  1, mdji = mdij   ag is a convex set.
Proof of Lemma A4: SinceM is symmetric with respect to the diagonal
mdij = m
d
ji, let us consider a  0. Setting mdji = mdij   a in (14), dene
k(mdij)  Fi(mdij;mdij   a)
= 

(1 + a  2mdij)mdij(mdij   a)
1=3
+

(1 + a  2mdij)(mdij   a)
1=2   (1 + a mdij)
Since mdji = m
d
ij   a  0 and 1  mdij + mdji = 2mdij   a, the domain of the
function k is
a  mdij 
1 + a
2
where 0  a < 1
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By Lemma A2, the intersection of the set M and the line mdji = m
d
ij   a is the
set of points satisfying
k(mdij) > 0:
We show that function k(mdij) is strictly concave on (a;
1+a
2
), and thus the set
of points satisfying the inequality is convex. Di¤erentiation of the function k
yields
k0(mdij) = A(m
d
ij) +B(m
d
ij) + 
where
A(mdij) 

3

(1 + a  2mdij)mdij(mdij   a)
 2=3  6(mdij)2 + 2mdij(1 + 3a)  a(1 + a)
B(mdij) 

2

(1 + a  2mdij)(mdij   a)
 1=2
(1 + 3a  4mdij)
The second derivative of k is
k00(mdij) = A
0(mdij) +B
0(mdij)
where
A0(mdij) =  
2

(mdij)
2(1 + 3a2)  a(1 + a)(1 + 3a)mdij + a2(1 + a)2
	
9

(1 + a  2mdij)mdij(mdij   a)
5=3
=  
2
h
mdij(1 + 3a
2)  a(1+a)(1+3a)
2
i2
+ 3a
2(1+a)2(1 a)2
4

9

(1 + a  2mdij)mdij(mdij   a)
5=3
(1 + 3a2)
B0(mdij) =  
(1  a)2
4

(1 + a  2mdij)(mdij   a)
3=2
implying that k00(mdij) = A
0(mdij) + B
0(mdij) < 0 on (a;
1+a
2
), so k is strictly
concave on (a; 1+a
2
). Thus, fmdij 2 (a; 1+a2 ) j k(mdij) > 0g is convex, and the
proof of the lemma is complete.
Lemma A5: Every point in M \ ((0; 0); (1; 1)) has a neighborhood con-
tained in M .
Proof of Lemma A5: This follows directly from the denition of M ; it
implies that M is an open set.
Theorem A2 follows directly from the combination of all of the lemmata in
this section.
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6.3 Appendix c
Lemma A6: The function g(m) dened by (20) has the following properties:
(i) g(m) is strictly quasi-concave on

0; 1
2

.
(ii) g(m) achieves its maximal value at mB 2 [1
3
; 2
5
].
(iii) The point (mB;mB) corresponds to the bliss point B in Figure 2, which
is the unique point contained in every M that is nonempty.
Proof of Lemma A6: (i) and (ii): For m 2 0; 1
2

, let
x(m)  m
1 m or m(x) =
x
1 + x
and dene
G(x)   (1  x)x21=3 +  [(1  x)x]1=2 for x 2 [0; 1] (26)
Then, using denition (20)
g(m) = G(x(m))
Hence,
g0(m) = G0(x(m))  x0(m)
Notice that
x0(m) = 1 +
m
(1 m)2 > 0
so
g0(m) R 0 exactly as G0(x(m)) R 0.
Now
G0(x) = C(x) +D(x)
where
C(x)  
3
[(1  x)x2] 2=3 (2  3x)x
D(x)  
2
[(1  x)x] 1=2 (1  2x)
Taking the derivatives of C and D respectively yields
C 0(x) =  2
9
(1  x) 5=3x 4=3 < 0
D0(x) =  
4
(1  x) 3=2x 3=2 < 0
Therefore, considering that
C(x) R 0 as x Q 2=3
D(x) R 0 as x Q 1=2
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we can conclude that there exists a unique x 2 [1=2; 2=3] such that
G0(x) R 0 as x Q x
meaning that G is strictly single peaked and strictly quasi-concave, achieving
its maximum value exactly at x. Hence, the function g(m) also is strictly
single peaked and strictly quasi-concave, achieving its maximum value at
mB  m(x) = x

1 + x
2 [1=3; 2=5]
(iii) To show that the point (mB;mB) corresponds to the bliss point B in
Figure 2, let us recall how the bliss point has been dened. Let M() be the
set M under the parameter value  > 0. Then, a point (mdij;
mdji) 2 R2 is
called a bliss point if it holds that for any  > 0,
M () 6= ; =) (mdij;mdji) 2M () (27)
To show the existence and the uniqueness of such a point, since M() is
symmetric to the upward sloping diagonal, let us focus on the lower half of
M(), and dene
ML() =

(mdij;m
d
ji) 2M() j mdij  mdji
	
Then, by Lemma A2, ML() coincides with the lower part of Mi associated
with :
ML() =

(mdij;m
d
ji) 2Mi() j mdij  mdji
	
= f(mdij;mdji) 2 R2 j mdij  mdji  0;mdij +mdji  1;
f(mdij;m
d
ji) + h(m
d
ij;m
d
ji)  (1 mdji) > 0g
When mdij + m
d
ji = 1 or m
d
ji = 0, we have f(m
d
ij;m
d
ji) = h(m
d
ij;m
d
ji) = 0,
implying that ML() does not contain any point (mdij;m
d
ji) such that m
d
ij +
mdji = 1 or m
d
ji = 0. Thus, we can rewrite M
L() as follows:
ML() =
n
(mdij;m
d
ji) 2 R2 j mdij  mdji > 0;mdij +mdji < 1;
f(mdij ;m
d
ji)
1 mdji
+
h(mdij ;m
d
ji)
1 mdji
> 
o
= f(mdij;mdji) 2 R2 j mdij  mdji > 0;mdij +mdji < 1;

h
1  mdij
1 mdji

mdij
1 mdji
mdji
1 mdji
i1=3
+ 
h
1  mdij
1 mdji

mdji
1 mdji
i1=2
> g
(28)
Given any (mdij;m
d
ji) 2ML() such that mdij > mdji, dene
m  m
d
ij +m
d
ji
2
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Then, mdij > m > m
d
ji, and (m;m) 2ML() by Lemma A3. Furthermore,
1  m
1 m

m
1 m
2
 
 
1  m
d
ij
1 mdji
!
mdij
1 mdji
mdji
1 mdji
=
(1 mdij  mdji)m2
(1 m)3  
(1 mdij  mdji)mdijmdji
(1 mdji)3
>
(1 mdij  mdji)
(1 mdji)3
(m2  mdijmdji)
=
(1 mdij  mdji)
(1 mdji)3
(mdij  mdji)2
4
> 0
Likewise, 
1  m
1 m

m
1 m  
 
1  m
d
ij
1 mdji
!
mdji
1 mdji
=
(1 mdij  mdji)m
(1 m)2  
(1 mdij  mdji)mdji
(1 mdji)2
>
(1 mdij  mdji)
(1 mdji)2
(m mdji) > 0
Therefore, using the function g(m) dened by (20), we can conclude that when
mdij > m
d
ji and m  (mdij +mdji)=2,
g(m) > 
" 
1  m
d
ij
1 mdji
!
mdij
1 mdji
mdji
1 mdji
#1=3
+
" 
1  m
d
ij
1 mdji
!
mdji
1 mdji
#1=2
(29)
Moreover, (i) and (ii) of Lemma A6 mean that
g(mb) > g(m) for any m 6= mb (30)
Combining (28), (29) and (30), we can conclude that given any (mdij;m
d
ji) such
that mdij  mdji
(mdij;m
d
ji) 2ML() =) (mB;mB) 2ML().
That is,
ML() 6= ; =) (mB;mB) 2ML() (31)
Hence, the point (mB;mB) is a bliss point. Finally, to show that the bliss point
is unique, take any  > 0 such that ML() 6= ;, and take any (mdij;mdji) 2
ML() such that (mdij;m
d
ji) 6= (mB;mB). If mdij > mdji, then the inequality
30
(29) holds when (mdij;m
d
ji) is replaced with (m
d
ij;m
d
ji). If m
d
ij = m
d
ji, then
g(mB) > g(mdij) by (30). Hence, if we dene
"  g(mB) 
8<:
" 
1  m
d
ij
1 mdji
!
mdij
1 mdji
mdji
1 mdji
#1=3
+ 
" 
1  m
d
ij
1 mdji
!
mdji
1 mdji
#1=29=;
then " is positive. Replacing  with g(mB)  "
2
and (mdij;m
d
ji) with (m
d
ij;m
d
ji)
in (28), we can see that
(mdij;m
d
ji) =2ML

g(mB)  "
2

whereas (mB;mB) 2 ML  g(mB)  "
2

. Thus, the point (mdij;m
d
ji) is not con-
tained in the nonempty setML
 
g(mB)  "
2

, implying that the point (mdij;m
d
ji) 6=
(mB;mB) is not a bliss point.
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